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COMMENT
CONTINUATION AND REPRESENTATION OF CLASS
ACTIONS FOLLOWING DISMISSAL OF THE
CLASS REPRESENTATIVE
Since 1966, the amended class action procedure of rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 has become one of the principal
tools for enforcing plaintiffs' rights and protecting constitutionally
guaranteed civil liberties.' When invoked on behalf of a definable
group of plaintiffs, the class action may be used to obtain, in a single
proceeding, broad scale relief for the benefit of the entire class. The
utility of the class action remedy, however, depends upon the extent to
which the federal courts are willing and able to designate the claims of
such groups as appropriate subjects for class action treatment.3 Util-
1. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
Rule 23 was substantially amended in 1966 to resolve uncertainties associated with
the former rule and to provide an effective vehicle for obtaining broad scale relief. See
Proposed Amendments, 39 F.R.D. 73, 94-107 (1966).
HEREAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS
COMMENT:
J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTcp (2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as MooRE];
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcrcE AND PROCEDURE (1969) [hereinafter
cited as WRIGHT & MILLFR].
2. See Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 468 F.2d 172, 179 (5th Cir. 1972). See generally
3B MooRE 23.40, at 23-653; 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1771; 7A WRIGHT & MILLER
§ 1776; Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966).
The class action has become a significant tool for the enforcement of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1447; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1971a-1975d, 2000a to h-6
(1970), especially the employment discrimination provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
See generally Donelan, Prerequisites to a Class Action under New Rule 23, 10 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. REv. 527, 544 (1969); Miller, Class Actions and Employment Discrim-
ination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 Miss. LIJ. 275 (1972);
Subrin & Sutton, Welfare Class Actions in Federal Court, 8 HARv. Civ. RiGHs-Crv.
Lin. L. Rnv. 21 (1973); Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 178 (1969); Note, Title
VII and Postjudgment Class Actions, 47 IND. L.J. 350 (1972).
3. A basic philosophical point of departure in class action decisions is whether
federal class action practice should be encouraged. See, e.g., La Mar v. H & B Novelty
& Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 463-68 (9th Cir. 1973). Numerous commentators have
spoken out against the class action, calling it an engine of destruction which is
weighted too heavily in favor of the plaintiff and which presents unjustifiably ineffec-
tive procedures for doing mass justice. See generally Katarincic & McClain, Federal
Class Actions Under Rule 23: How to Improve the Merits of Your Action Without
Improving the Merits of Your Claim, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 429 (1972); Pollack, Class
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ity also depends upon the strictness of the standards applied by the
court for determining the fitness of the asserted class representative
to seek relief on behalf of the class.4
Subsections (a) and (b) of rule 23 posit the fundamental stand-
ards to be used in determining whether a claim can qualify for class ac-
tion treatment.5 However, these sections do not deal comprehensively
with the criteria which an individual must satisfy in order to represent
the class in court.6 The absence of any such clear criteria has made it
Actions Reconsidered: Theory and Practice Under Rule 23, 28 Bus. LAw. 741 (1973);
Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1972).
Other writers have countered with arguments that proposals to restrict class actions are
premature and that the practical problems of managing effective class litigation are su-
perable. See Ashe, Class Action: Solution for the Seventies, 7 NEw ENG. L. Rav. 1
(1971); Berger, Class Actions, 77 CASE & COMmENT 26 (1972); Pomerantz, New De-
velopments in Class Actions-Has Their Death Knell Been Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAw.
1259 (1970); Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58
F.R.D. 299 (1973). But since it was originally envisioned that the fundamental mech-
anism of rule 23 should be permissively construed, see generally Advisory Committee's
Note to Rule 23, supra note 2, these basic attitudes for or against class action proce-
dure should not color an evaluation of the analysis herein.
4. Cf. LaSala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97
Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971). See also Degnan, Foreword: Adequacy of Representation in
Class Actions, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 705 (1972).
5. The prerequisites applicable to every class action are enumerated in FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(a):
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative par-
ties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Additionally, a class action must also qualify under one of the three subsections of rule
23(b) in order to be maintainable. Rule 23(b)(1) authorizes the use of the class ac-
tion where a series of individual suits might subject the defendant to conflicting adju-
dications or might impair the ability of separate members of the class to protect their
rights; subsection (b) (2) allows class actions in cases where the appropriate remedy
is predominantly injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
subsection (b) (3) permits individual damages to be sought on behalf of all the mem-
bers of a class provided that common questions of law and fact predominate over indi-
vidual matters in the case and that the class action is a superior mechanism for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Although the prerequisites for a
class action are clearly set forth in these sections of the rule, the courts must nonethe-
less use their discretion in determining whether a particular action qualifies. See Gold
Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen, 436 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1970); City of New York
v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969). See generally
7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1785, at 134.
6. The only specific prerequisite of the rule directly applicable to the representa-
tive parties is rule 23(a) (4)'s requirement that they will "fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class." Not only is this requirement unaccompanied by other cri-
teria governing the selection of the class representative, but also its own meaning is not
further elaborated elsewhere in the rule. See notes 122-53 infra and accompanying text.
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especially difficult to deal with the situation which arises when the only
named representative in a class action, after asserting a justiciable
claim on his own behalf,7 loses that individual cause of action prior to
a full determination on the merits of the claim presented on behalf of
the class.8 In this situation it is unclear whether the class aspect of the
action should be allowed to continue, and if so, whether the unsuccess-
ful individual party should be allowed to continue serving as the repre-
sentative of the class interests.9 Since the subject has been treated in-
consistently and unsystematically by the courts, this Comment will at-
tempt to clarify this aspect of federal class action practice.
In order to define the scope of the problem, this Comment will
first describe the various ways in which the problem typically arises.
Through examining a number of recent decisions, it will be shown that
a conflict presently exists among the courts which cannot be resolved
or explained away merely on the basis of factual differences among the
cases. Instead, the courts seem to have proceeded, to a significant de-
gree, on an ad hoc basis, which has afforded them the discretion nec-
essary for the dispensation of individual justice, but which has simul-
taneously resulted in inconsistent judicial treatment and has created
the appearance of judicial overreaching. In order to clarify this aspect
It should be noted, however, that the extensive 1966 amendments to rule 23 did
substantially shift the rule's emphasis in this regard. See note 9 infra.
7. As to the importance of the class representative's initially asserting a justiciable
personal claim, as well as a justiciable claim on behalf of the class, see notes 23-25
infra and accompanying text.
8. The problem usually arises when only one named plaintiff is involved. If
other representative plaintiffs remain before the court, then, regardless of the dismissal
of one of them, the ability of the remaining representatives to continue representing
the class action is unimpaired. See Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian
Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967). See also Arkansas Educ. Ass'n v. Board
of Educ., 446 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1971); Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 349 F.
Supp. 605 (S.D. Ind. 1972).
9. It seems likely that the 1966 amendments to rule 23 significantly enhanced the
probability of this issue arising as a real problem for the courts. Prior to 1966, rule
23 predicated the right to represent a class upon the conceptual character of the right
sought to be enforced. See Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23, supra note 2.
Thus, a named plaintiff who himself had been determined to have no enforceable right
in the action would be an unlikely candidate as a continuing representative of the class.
By describing the occasions for maintaining class actions in terms such as the typicality
of claims presented and the type of remedy sought, the current version of the rule has
shifted its criteria towards the relationship which exists between the representative in
the action and the class which he purports to represent. See generally Wright, supra
note 2, at 177. Thus a named representative, who has lost on his personal claim and
thereby no longer has a personal right to be enforced in the action, may nevertheless
continue to be otherwise closely related to the class and may thereby be found an ade-
quate representative to continue the action on behalf of the class. See note 59 infra
and accompanying text.
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of the law, this Comment will suggest the use of an analytical approach
which reduces this procedural problem to two distinct questions: (1)
when can a class action be recognized as an aotion independent of a
given representative's cause of action, and (2) upon which character-
istics of the class representative is the adequate representation of a class
action predicated? It will be demonstrated that these two inquiries are
logically distinguishable and mutually independent. By considering
the bases upon which these questions should be resolved in any given
case, the Comment will then conclude by attempting to frame a con-
sistent and well-founded procedure which sufficiently defines the legal
rights of the class and its representative following the dismissal of the
representative's individual claims.
BAsic ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM AND HOW IT ARiSES
In a normal two-party suit, the dismissal of one party terminates
the proceeding. 10 However, when a party represents or purports to
represent a class of aggrieved persons similarly situated, some courts
have found that the class aspect of the litigation may proceed even fol-
lowing the termination of the individual representative's cause of ac-
tion." In such cases the court, in effect, finds that the class
may yet achieve what the individual representative could not. 12  A
syllogistic analysis of this situation might cause one to conclude that
such a court must have adopted a logically inconsistent position in per-
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).
11. See cases cited note 69 infra. Rule 23 itself does not specify whether a class
action may be dismissed by the court upon the ground that the representative's action
has terminated, either because of mootness, separate adjudication, or other reason, prior
to a final judgment concerning the class claims. The only requirement imposed upon
the court concerning the dismissal of class actions appears in rule 23(e), which pro-
vides notice to the class of voluntary settlements of the action:
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval
of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall begiven to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs. FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(e).
See generally 3B MooRE 23.80[3]. For discussion of the applicability of rule 23(e)
to dismissals which do not prejudice the rights of the class, see notes 96, 97 infra and
accompanying text.
12. It has been said that the individual may not achieve through the class what
he himself cannot achieve alone. See Mintz v. Mathers Fund, Inc., 463 F.2d 495, 499
(7th Cir. 1972); Croskey St. Concerned Citizens v. Romney, 459 F.2d 109, 113 (3d
Cit. 1972) (Aldisert, J., concurring). But this statement focuses on the rights of the
named plaintiff rather than on the rights of the class. The primary question in the
cases here under consideration is not what the named plaintiff can or cannot achieve
alone, but instead what the class is entitled to achieve once the named plaintiff's indi-
vidual claim has been terminated either through separate adjudication or through moot-
ness. See text accompanying notes 108-10 infra.
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mitting the class action to continue. If the named plaintiff is truly simi-
larly situated with the class which he purports to represent, and if the
named plaintiff has lost his individual cause of action, then it would
seem either to be the case that the remaining members of the class
have similarly unsuccessful claims or else the first premise, that they
are similarly situated with the plaintiff, is false. Likewise, if one con-
tends that the named plaintiff is not similarly situated with the class
which he purports to represent, then it would seem inescapable that he
has neither the right nor the ability under rule 23 to maintain an action
on behalf of such a class.
Although this line of reasoning is based upon a justifiably felt
necessity, which is implicit in the requirements of rule 23,'13 for re-
quiring typicality of the claims and defenses of the representative and
for insisting on the fair and adequate representation of the class, the
result which it reaches cannot be specifically supported or required by
the actual language of the rule. Rule 23 says nothing of a need for the
named plaintiff to be "similarly situated," let alone "identically situ-
ated" with the rest of the class. 4 Rather, the rule only requires that
there be questions of law or fact "common to" the class, 15 and that the
named plaintiff's individual claim be "typical" of the claims or de-
fenses of the class.'" The commonality requirement, however,
does not require that all the questions of law and fact raised by the dis-
pute be common; nor does it establish any quantitative or qualitative
test of commonality. All that can be divined from the rule itself is
-that the use of the plural "questions" suggests that more than one issue
of law or fact must be common to members of the class. 7
Indeed, one commentator has concluded that the typicality provision of
the rule is wholly superfluous.' 8 Neither does the prerequisite of typ-
icality rise to a demand that the class representative's claim be coexten-
sive' 9 or "typically successful" '2 with respect to those of the class. Fur-
13. FED. R. COv. P. 23(a)(2), (3), (4). See generally Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32 (1940); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Smith v.
Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853); Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus.,
Inc., 326 F. Supp. 98, 103 (D. Colo. 1971); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 500
(E.D.N.Y. 1968); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 636 (D.
Kan. 1968); 3B MooRE 23.02[1], at 23-74.
14. See Siegal v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 726-27 (N.D. Cal.
1967). See generally Donelan, supra note 2, at 527.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
16. Id. 23(a)(3). For further discussion of the typicality requirement, see notes
134-36 infra and accompanying text.
17. 7 WRiGuT & MILLER § 1763, at 603-04 (footnotes omitted).
18. 3B MooRE 1 23.06-1.
19. "To the extent that 'co-extensive' might suggest that the representatives' claims
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thermore, the rule does not require the named plaintiff himself to be
"representative" of the class, but only that he be able to protect the in-
terests of the absent class members fairly and adequately.21 Thus it ap-
pears to be possible for the requirements, precisely as expressed in the
language of the rule, to be fulfilled despite the lack of the named plain-
tiff's continued stake in the outcome of the litigation.
This is not to say that any unaggrieved party may obtain a judi-
cial forum merely by denominating his complaint a class action. It
has recently been recognized that the problem of whether the class ac-
tion should be allowed to continue and whether the individually unsuc-
cessful named plaintiff should be allowed to continue to represent the
class can only arise after the named plaintiff has asserted a justiciable
personal claim against the defendant. 22  Failure on the part of the rep-
must be substantially identical to those of the absent class members, it is too demand-
ing a standard." 7 WRiGHT & MiLLER § 1764, at 613. "Absolute identity is not re-
quired . . . ." Degnan, supra note 4, at 716 (discussing CAL. R. Civ. P. 23, which
has been applied in the same manner as the federal rule).
A number of courts have taken a relatively permissive approach to rule 23(a) (3)'s
requirement of typical claims or defenses and have permitted factual variations in the
claims of the plaintiff class. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d
Cir. 1968); Fischer v. Weaver, 55 F.R.D. 454 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Iowa v. Union Asphalt
& Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968).
20. For example, an employee alleging discrimination in the employment practices
of his employer might well raise complaints that are typical of the class concerning
allegations of lower pay, inferior working conditions, and longer promotion schedules
for class members. But he still might be unable to recover on his individual claim
because of the presence in his own employment record of excessive absences, frequent
tardiness, poor production performance or other factors which would have provided
valid grounds for dismissal in his particular case. See, e.g., Huff v. N.D. Cass Co.,
485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13 (4th Cir.
1972); MeAdory v. Scientific Research Instruments, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 468, 471-73 (D.
Md. 1973). As another example, an insider may raise claims on behalf of himself
which are typical of claims made by an entire class of stock purchasers, but still be
prohibited from personally recovering because of restrictions against insider trading un-
der the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Mersay v. First Republic Corp., 43
F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Therefore, individual claims need not be "typically suc-
cessful" in order to be typical under 23(a)(3). See also Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co.,
476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973); Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d
1362, 1366 n.2 (1st Cir. 1972); Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir.
1971); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
See generally 7A WRiGHT & MILLER § 1785, at 131-39; Advisory Committee's Notes
to Rule 23, supra note 2, at 102-03.
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4). See generally Donelan, supra note 2, at 535; Ford,
Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L.
REv. 501, 509 (1969); Wright, supra note 2, at 172; Note, Class Actions: Defining
the Typical and Representative Plaintiff Under Subsections (a)(3) and (4) of Fed-
eral Rule 23, 53 BOSTON U.L. Rnv. 406 (1973).
22. See Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 974 (1971), where the court said:
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resentative plaintiff to allege any real and immediate threatened or ac-
tual injury to himself at the outset of the action will cause both the in-
dividual and the class aspects of the complaint to be dismissed for fail-
ure to satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of article H. 2"
This position was expressly endorsed by the Supreme Court in O'Shea v.
Littleton, 4 where the Court said: "[T]f none of the named plaintiffs
purporting to represent a class establishes the requisites of a case or
controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of him-
self or any other member of the class."'2 5  Accordingly, the problem
of continuing class action status can only arise when, in addition to fil-
ing an action on behalf of the class, the representative has both as-
serted and lost a justiciable individual claim.
Such a loss may be occasioned by the factual inadequacy of the
representative's individual claim or may rest upon legal grounds. Fac-
tual inadequacy is found when the representative's claim, though ade-
Before one may successfully institute a class action "[i]t is of course necessary
generally that [he] be able to show injury to himself in order to entitle him
to seek judicial relief." . . . In short, a predicate to [a named plaintiff's]
right to represent a class is his eligibility to sue in his own right. Id. at 734
(citation omitted).
But cf. Vulcan Soc'y of N.Y. City Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d
387 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.), holding that a representative action could be main-
tained by individual plaintiffs asserting a number of related claims, even though the
individual plaintiffs were not personally affected by some of the allegations. Id. at
399-400.
23. U.S. CoNsT. art. m, § 2. See generally Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,
240-41 (1937).
24. 42 U.S.L.W. 4139 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1974).
In O'Shea, the plaintiffs had brought a class action on behalf of the black citizens
of Cairo, Illinois, alleging discriminatory and unconstitutional administration of crim-
inal justice by city officials through the imposition of higher bonds, harsher sentences,
and more expensive court fees upon black defendants in criminal cases. At the time
the suit was filed, however, none of the named representatives was himself either serv-
ing an allegedly illegal sentence or on trial or awaiting trial before the state magistrate.
Id. at 4140. Having found no case or controversy, the Court made no determination
concerning the maintainability of the class aspect of the action. It was suggested, how-
ever, that it may have been unmaintainable on the grounds of unmanageability as well.
Id. at 4141 n.3.
25. Id. at 4141. To create a case or controversy, the class advocate must do more
than baldly assert a claim that such a controversy exists. See Watkins v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 406 F.2d 1234, 1236-37 (7th Cir. 1969); Stephenson v. Stephenson,
249 F.2d 203, 208 (7th Cir. 1957). However, exactly how much he must claim and
prove is not clearly defined. In some instances the court will at least require proof
that other class members exist who might be adversely affected by the alleged miscon-
duct. See Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228, 1232-33 (1st Cir. 1972). On other occa-
sions the representative plaintiff has been required to allege and prove discrimination
against at least one other member of the proposed class. Hadnott v. Laird, 463 F.2d
304 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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quate on its face as stating a legally cognizable cause of action, is
manifestly incapable of being proven.26 Legal grounds for dismissal, on
the other hand, may exist in several forms. One of the legal grounds
for the termination of the class representative's individual cause of ac-
tion subsequent to filing is mootness. Mootness may arise from an
unforeseen change in the personal situation of the representative which
causes him to lose his claim involuntarily, 27 or it may result from vol-
untary action on his part.28  It may also result from a loss of standing
to maintain his personal claim due to the defendant's acquiescence to
the individual demands of the class representative. 29 Other possible
26. See, e.g., Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973); Rothblum v.
Board of Trustees, 474 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1973); Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853 (4th
Cir. 1973).
27. See, e.g., Wymelenberg v. Syman, 54 F.R.D. 198 (E.D. Wis. 1972). In Wy-
melenberg, the plaintiff brought a class action alleging that Wisconsin's divorce statute,
which required a two-year period of in-state residency as a prerequisite to obtaining
access to the state court, was unconstitutional. After filing the individual and class
complaints but prior to the certification of the class, the plaintiff's wife died. The
court held that the plaintiff's involuntary removal from the class of married persons
subject to the statutory provision did not destroy the right of the other members of
the class to have the action concluded on their behalf. The court did not reach the
question of whether the plaintiff would adequately represent the class interests, since,
due to the nature of the claim, no facts were in dispute, and it promptly held the stat-
ute unconstitutional. Id. at 199.
28. See, e.g., Palmer v. National Cash Register Co., 346 F. Supp. 1043 (S.D. Ohio
1972); Fogg v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 346 F. Supp. 645 (D.N.H. 1972); Vaughan
v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37 (D. Ariz.), affd, 400 U.S. 884 (1970); Rackley v. Board
of Trustees, 238 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.S.C. 1965). On most occasions of this sort, the
plaintiff has cooperated with conciliatory offers by the defendant and so, technically
speaking, both parties have voluntarily acted to the derogation of the plaintiff's per-
sonal cause of action.
29. See, e.g., Hines v. City Fin. Co., 474 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Rivera v.
Freeman, 469 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1972); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28
(5th Cir. 1968); Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375
F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967); Gatling v. Butler, 52 F.R.D. 389 (D. Conn. 1971) (all hold-
ing such acquiescence not to justify dismissal). Contra, Heumann v. Board of Educ.,
320 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). To allow the defendant to successfully moot a
class action by self-initiated acquiescence with the named plaintiff's individual demands
might encourage the defendant to avoid class litigation by picking off class representa-
tives one at a time. This would contravene the basic policy of class action practice
which is to avoid a multiplicity of suits. See Bledsoe, Mootness and Standing in Class
Actions, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 430 (1973).
A defendant may, however, seek to moot a class action by complying generally
with the asserted demands of the entire class. See, e.g., Gray v. Board of Trustees,
342 U.S. 517 (1952); Caplin v. Oak, 356 F. Supp. 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Lopez v.
White Plains Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). If the court
views such acquiescence as a disingenuous attempt by the defendant to forestall litiga-
tion without putting to rest the underlying controversy in the case, however, the court
may permit the class action to proceed. See, e.g., McGuire v. Roebuck, 347 F. Supp.
1111 (E.D. Tex. 1972); Vaughan v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37 (D. Ariz.), affd, 400 U.S.
884 (1970).
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legal grounds for dismissal of the representative's personal claim in-
clude its settlement by arbitration ° or application of the doctrine of res
judicata due to the claim's accelerated adjudication, either in the same
forum 1 or in another court," prior to the adjudication of the pending
class controversy. While these two categories of ways in which the
class representative can lose his claim may serve as general reference
points, the line between legal grounds for dismissal and the factual in-
adequacy of the representative's claim is not free from ambiguity.
Factual findings must support legal determinations of mootness, stand-
ing, and res judicata; and legal rules are essential for estimating the
factual adequacy of the representative's personal arguments.33  Thus,
any class-representative plaintiff whose personal cause of action found-
ers because of legal or evidentiary deficiencies may find his class-initi-
ated suit in an uncertain legal posture.
The Supreme Court has not yet taken a position as to the proper
status of either the class action or the class representative following
the loss to the representative of his personal cause of action subsequent
to his filing of a class action along with a justiciable personal claim.
Indeed, when the Court confronted this question in Indiana Employ-
ment Security Division v. Burney, 4 it refused to decide it. In Burney,
the named plaintiff filed a class action alleging that the Indiana system
of administering unemployment insurance conflicted with section 303-
(a)(1) of the Social Security Act.3 5 The basis for this charge was that
the state of Indiana had suspended the named plaintiff's unemploy-
ment benefits without a prior administrative hearing. After the plain-
tiff filed the action, she was granted such a hearing to determine
whether her benefits had been wrongfully terminated. Nevertheless,
30. See Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970).
31. See, e.g., Smith v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 486 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1973); Huff
v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973); Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853
(4th Cir. 1973); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1972).
32. See, e.g., Spriggs v. Wilson, 467 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Watkins v. Chi-
cago Housing Authority, 406 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1969).
33. An interesting case from the Seventh Circuit presents the problem as it ap-
proaches this borderline situation. In Mintz v. Mathers Fund, Inc., 463 F.2d 495 (7th
Cir. 1972), the plaintiff in a stockholders' derivative action held 15 shares of the de-
fendant corporation's stock. At trial it was discovered that the shareholder could not
prove his ownership for the time periods relevant to the alleged offenses. Since own-
ership was the sole legal ground for the plaintiff's interest in the action, the class com-
plaint was dismissed. Id. at 498-99.
34. 409 U.S. 540 (1973) (per curiam).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1) (1970), which provides that the Secretary of Labor
shall not certify for payment any state unless he finds that such state's laws provide
for administrative methods which are "reasonably calculated to insure full payment of
unemployment compensation when due."
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prior to a final resolution of the administrative proceedings, the three-
judge court below granted summary judgment to the plaintiff and her
class.36 In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court vacated the de-
cision of the lower court and remanded the case for a determination of
mootness a7 While this disposition of the case might seem to imply
that the Supreme Court would allow a defendant to moot a class action
by voluntarily acceding to the named plaintiff's individual demands,
this issue was not directly before the court in the Burney case. Fur-
thermore, the opinion is short and it provides little guidance for deter-
mining when an action may be mooted as to a class of unnamed per-
sons who still are likely to remain aggrieved subsequent to the moot-
ness of their representative's claim. Nor does it indicate any criteria
that can be applied to the original representative of such a class which,
if met, would permit that action to continue under his leadership.
When similar situations have been presented to other courts, the
responses have been ad hoc and inconsistent. 8 Thus, a coherent ana-
lytical approach has yet to be developed for resolving these issues.
As a result, there are no generally accepted guidelines on which de-
cisions can be based. The remaining portion of this Comment, there-
fore, shall first look more closely at the lower court cases which have
dealt with this issue and then shall conclude by proposing such a meth-
od of analysis.
CURRENT JUDICIAL TREATMENT
The solution to the problem concerning the continued legal status
of the class action and -the class representative following the loss to the
representative of his individual cause of action hinges on the answer to
36. Hiatt v. Indiana Employment Security Div., 347 F. Supp. 218 (N.D. Ind.
1971). The defendants then appealed the decision directly to the Supreme Court under
28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
37. 409 U.S. at 542. As in O'Shea, there was a strong dissent by Justice Douglas,
who argued that since the plaintiff had not received from the defendant the precise
relief sought, and since dismissal would allow the defendant to create a "litigious
merry-go-round," the court should have affirmed the summary judgment for the plain-
tiff and her class. Id. at 544.
38. Compare Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973) with Rothblum
v. Board of Trustees, 474 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1973). In both cases the named plaintiff's
individual claim was subjected to a preliminary hearing on its merits and was found
wanting before the trial court had consented to entertain certification of the class ac-
tion; but where the Fifth Circuit found the resultant dismissal of the action to be in
error, the Third Circuit sustained. Contradictory results on practically identical facts
also were reached in Gatling v. Butler, 52 F.R.D. 389 (D. Conn. 1971) (allowing the
class aspect of the litigation to continue), and Wojcik v. Noren, 349 F. Supp. 1286
(D. Conn. 1972) (disallowing the class action).
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one basic question: what relationship, if any, exists between the
termination of the named representative's individual stake in the liti-
gation and the capacity of the class to continue as a valid independent
entity before the court? In most instances, opinion writers have adopted
one of two views concerning the relationship between the dismissal of
the representative's cause of action and the continued maintainability
of the class action.39 The first view asserts that the dismissal of the
named plaintiff necessitates the complete termination of the class ac-
tion. The second view rejects the validity of the first and holds that
once the named plaintiff has properly pleaded a class action, the loss
of his individual cause of action generally has no effect either on the
continued maintainability of the class action or on the propriety of his
continuing to serve as the representative of the class. Two distinct
lines of cases corresponding to these views have developed among the
federal courts.
First Approach: Stake in the Outcome as a Necessary Condition for
Maintaining Class Action Status
The origin of this first line of cases arises out of dicta in two
early decisions by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United
States Supreme Court. These cases suggested that a named plaintiff
cannot maintain a class action unless he has a personal stake in its out-
come. In the first of these cases, City of Kansas City v. Williams,"°
the Eighth Circuit, having found that the named plaintiffs had ade-
quately proven personal injury, nevertheless commented:
It is of course necessary generally that a plaintiff be able to show
injury to himself in order to entitle him to seek judicial relief. He cannot
be a mere volunteer and ask judicial intervention simply "because some-
one else may be hurt," but he "must present facts sufficient to show that
his individual need requires the remedy for which he asks."'41
In somewhat the same context, the Supreme Court stated in Bailey v.
Patterson42 that plaintiffs "cannot represent a class of whom they
39. Compare notes 44, 69 infra.
40. 205 F.2d 47 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 826 (1953). The actual holding
of this case is that where class action treatment does not serve some useful purpose,
for example in preventing a multiplicity of suits, the action will be denied class action
status. Here the individual plaintiff won his individual law suit but failed to offer
proof that other blacks had been denied access to public swimming facilities as he had
been.
41. Id. at 51 (citations omitted).
42. 369 U.S. 31 (1962). This case held in part that a plaintiff may represent a
class only with respect to those allegations which the plaintiff has personal standing
to assert. The question is therefore left entirely open whether a plaintiff who loses
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are not a part. '43  These cases did not go so far as to adopt the view
that if a named plaintiff loses his personal cause of action subsequent
to filing a class action, the class action must be dismissed. But, per-
haps due to a somewhat indiscriminate reliance on the language from
these two frequently cited opinions, a number of courts appear subse-
quently to have adopted this even stronger position.44
For example, in Spriggs v. Wilson,45 a case in which the named
plaintiff's individual cause of action was mooted subsequent to filing
but prior to certification under rule 23(c)(1), the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit asserted that "[s]ince the case is
moot as to the [named plaintiff] it cannot be maintained as a class ac-
tion."4  In a similar procedural context, the Seventh Circuit likewise
asserted in Watkins v. Chicago Housing Authority47 that "[t]he instant
class action became moot when the Authority cancelled the eviction
his standing to sue after having had standing to file the action should be precluded
from continuing his action as a class action.
43. Id. at 32-33. Despite the holding in Bailey, several cases have held that an
association may be allowed to sue as a representative of its members in a class action
so long as the association is active and consists of a closely related membership, and
where it would actively pursue its members' interests. See, e.g., Arkansas Educ. Ass'n
v. Board of Educ., 446 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1971); Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d
770 (8th Cir. 1966). These cases depart from the strict rule in Bailey in that the asso-
ciations are not strictly members of the classes which they seek to represent.
44. Each of the following cases can be cited in support of the proposition that if
a plaintiff loses his personal cause of action after filing a class action or if he is ad-
judged on evidentiary grounds not to be an aggrieved member of the class which he
purports to represent, then that plaintiff cannot represent the class action, which there-
fore must be dismissed. See, e.g., Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969); Barr v. United
States, 478 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Rothblum v.
Board of Trustees, 474 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1973); Long v. District of Columbia, 469
F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Spriggs v. Wilson, 467 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Heard
v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1972); Mintz v. Mathers Fund, Inc., 463 F.2d
495 (7th Cir. 1972); Norman v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 458 F.2d 497 (2d
Cir. 1972); Davis v. Ichord, 442 F.2d 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Cash v. Swifton Land
Corp., 434 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1970); Watkins v. Chicago Housing Authority, 406 F.2d
1234 (7th Cir. 1969); Geehring v. Municipal Court, 357 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ohio
1973); Lopez v. White Plains Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Dilulfo v. Digicon, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 1284 (D. Md. 1972); City of Philadelphia v.
American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.NJ. 1971); Callier v. Hill, 326 F. Supp. 69
(W.D. Mo. 1970); Craddock v. Hill, 324 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Heumann
v. Board of Educ., 320 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Burney v. North Am. Rockwell
Corp., 302 F. Supp. 86 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
45. 467 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
46. Id. at 385. Certification of a class action constitutes the judicial recognition
that the action is maintainable as a class action. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1). For a
further discussion of the significance of certification, see notes 64, 67-68 infra and ac-
companying text.
47. 406 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1969).
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proceedings and restored the [representative] plaintiffs to their orig-
inal status .... -48 In another case, Norman v. Connecticut State Board
of Parole,49 the class action had proceeded to both certification and fi-
nal adjudication before the named plaintiff's cause of action became
moot during the pendency of the defendant's appeal. Due to the moot-
ness of the representative's claim, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit instructed the lower court to dismiss the action without preju-
dice, saying: "Since it is clear that a named plaintiff cannot bring
a suit for a class of which he is not a part ... we remand the case to
the district court with directions to dismiss without prejudice on
grounds of inadequacy of representation ... .
Several justifications have been offered for adherence to this strict
procedure. First, the courts adhering to this approach are justifiably
concerned that once a named plaintiff has lost his personal cause of
action, the prerequisites of the related class action can no longer be
sustained under rule 23. It has been argued that since the representa-
tive is no longer a member of the class, he lacks the representativeness
required by rule 23(a)(4) to continue to maintain a suit on behalf of
of the rest of the class.51 Moreover, grave apprehensions have been ex-
48. Id. at 1237.
49. 458 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1972).
50. Id. at 499. The Second Circuit instructed the trial court to retain the case on
its docket for 30 days before finally dismissing it in order to allow another representa-
tive to come forth on behalf of the class. In light of the circumstances of this case,
however, this fact does not materially distinguish the approach in Norman from the
approach in Watkins or Spriggs. This is because there was little, if any, likelihood
that another suitable representative would appear within the prescribed 30 day period.
In the first place, it was not certain that there would exist another person within 30
days of the Second Circuit's ruling who could fit the description of a class member-
a prisoner appearing without counsel before the Connecticut State Board of Parole in
a parole revocation hearing. Indeed, the Board of Parole could have prevented anyone
from becoming a class member either by delaying such a hearing, by allowing counsel
to such person without changing the Board's overall policy of not allowing counsel in
parole revocation hearings, by refusing to institute proceedings to revoke the parolee's
parole in the particular case, or by attempting to have the charges against the parolee
which jeopardized his parole dropped. Moreover, even if another parolee became so
situated that he would have been an adequate class representative, there is no indication
that the court was to provide notice to such person of the pending class action. Fi-
nally, even if such a parolee was found and was notified of the pending action, it is
not certain that he would consent to represent the class. Thus, because of the extreme
unlikelihood of another class member appearing before the court within 30 days to rep-
resent the class, the action by the Second Circuit in Norman was tantamount to a dis-
missal of the class action solely because of the mootness of the individual plaintiff's
claim.
51. For example, see the language in the Norman case, quoted in the text accom-
panying note 50 supra, where the Second Circuit explicitly based its dismissal of the
class action "on grounds of inadequacy of representation." See also Heard v. Mueller
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pressed that proceeding beyond the point of the representative's dis-
missal would leave no concrete adversity in -the case to sharpen the pres-
entation of issues. 52  Therefore, it is argued, to allow such an action
to continue would violate the case or controversy requirement of arti-
cle II, section 2 of the Constitution,5 3 and would engage the court in
the unauthorized solicitation of actions5 4 and the rendering of advisory
opinions. 5
Nevertheless, these arguments are not completely persuasive. By
viewing the dismissal of the named representative as leading directly
to the dismissal of the class action, the courts have overlooked a num-
ber of important considerations. As has already been observed, the
specific wording of rule 23(a)(4) only requires that the representative
"fairly and adequately protect" the interests of the class.50 It is not
self-evident that a dismissed representative plaintiff cannot do this,
especially when his own dismissal was involuntary or due to legal
technicalities. 57  There may indeed 'be situations in which the named
representative unquestionably would continue to represent the class
interests adequately despite the termination of his personal claim. 8 For
example, it is often the case, especially when a class action has been
Co., 464 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1972). But see Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710,
714 (5th Cir. 1973):
[Plaintiff] should not be found to be disqualified solely by an advance deter-
mination that his claim is predictably not a winning claim and that, therefore,
he cannot adequately represent the class as mandated by 23(a) (4).
See generally 7 Wiucrr & MuLnn § 1761.
52. See Watkins v. Chicago Housing Authority, 406 F.2d 1234, 1237 (7th Cir.
1969); Heumann v. Board of Educ., 320 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); cf. O'Shea
v. Littleton, 42 U.S.L.W. 4139 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1974).
53. Heumann v. Board of Educ., 320 F. Supp. 623, 624 (S.D.N.Y 1970).
54. It can be argued that once all grievances between the actual parties before the
court have been disposed of, further judicial cognizance of a controversy in any form
between such parties is unwarranted. See Elias v. National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 59
F.R.D. 276 (D. Minn. 1973), where, in response to a suggestion by the dismissed
named plaintiff that the court should retain jurisdiction over the class action and seek
another representative on its behalf, the court held that to issue notice of a class ac-
tion's pendency following the originally named plaintiff's refusal to prosecute the action
would be "in a sense merely soliciting a client for plaintiff's counsel . . . ." Id. at
277.
55. Id. See also O'Shea v. Littleton, 42 U.S.L.W. 4139 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1974).
56. See notes 13-21 supra and accompanying text.
57. Some cases have recognized that a representative plaintiff who has lost his in-
dividual cause of action can continue to adequately represent the class interests. See,
e.g., Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973); Wymelenberg v. Syman,
54 F.R.D. 198 (E.D. Wis. 1972). But see Mintz v. Mathers Fund, Inc., 463 F.2d 495
(7th Cir. 1972); Geehring v. Municipal Court, 357 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
For a further discussion of this issue, see notes 122-53 infra and accompanying text.
58. See La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 871-72, 489 P.2d
1113, 1117, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 853 (1971). See note 59 infra.
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brought for injunctive or declaratory relief, that a dismissed representa-
tive will retain close ties to the remaining class members and remain
strongly committed to vindicating the rights of the rest of the class. 9
Additionally, it may sometimes occur that no other class member would
be available to represent the class.6 0 Surely, where such circumstances
exist, allowing a dismissed representative who would continue to pro-
vide adequate representation for the class to remain as the class repre-
sentative would, in some cases, 61 be preferable to dismissing the class
action entirely and leaving the grievances of the class without judicial
consideration or redress.62
59. Suits for injunctive relief may be brought under any of the categories of rule
23(b), but they fall primarily under 23(b)(2). Such actions are especially adapted to
class complaints alleging violations of civil and constitutional rights, see generally 7A
WRIGrr & MILLER § 1776, and they encompass an area of the law in which the con-
cepts of the "private attorney general" and the "ideological plaintiff" are already fa-
miliar. See, e.g., Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 310 (5th Cir.
1970); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32 (5th Cir. 1968); Fogg v. New
Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 346 F. Supp. 645 (D.N.H. 1972); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), modified, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). See
also Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968); Jaffe, The
Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116
U. PA. L. Rav. 1033 (1968). In a 23(b)(2) action, it may often be the case that
the named plaintiff continues to feel a part of the aggrieved class and maintains a
strong personal interest in its welfare so that even though his individual cause of ac-
tion may be barred by some interceding event, defense, or ruling, he could still provide
adequate representation for the class.
Actions brought under 23(b)(3), on the other hand, are usually aggregations of
individual claims which seek monetary relief for past injuries. See generally 7A
WRIGHT & MLLED § 1784; Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial Relief in Class
Actions Under Federal Rule 23(b)(3), 54 F.R.D. 501 (1972); Comment, Rule 23:
Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rnv. 539, 542-47 (1969). A
representative who possesses no monetary stake in the outcome of such a class action,
where the primary motivation for proceeding is financial, would probably have less in-
centive to undergo the labor of providing adequate representation for the class than
would a representative who has a pecuniary interest in the result.
60. It may often be the case that no other class members are readily identifiable
to the court. See, e.g., Rivera v. Freeman, 469 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1972); Norman
v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 458 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1972); Wymelenberg v. Sy-
man, 54 F.R.D. 198 (E.D. Wis. 1972). In other situations, other class members may
be easily identified, but they may be reluctant to come forward for fear of reprisals
by the defendant or those closely allied with him. This is sometimes the case in class
actions brought by an employee against his employer, where, rightly or wrongly, the
other employees may fear that if they were to step forward to represent the class they
would lose their jobs. See Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th
Cir. 1970).
61. The sorts of cases in which such a disposition would be appropriate are dis-
cussed in notes 111-21 infra and accompanying text. In certain cases, Judge Friendly
suggests that allowing the representative to continue to represent the class will even
work to the convenience of the defendant. Vulcan Soc'y of N.Y. City Fire Dep't, Inc.
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 400 (2d Cir. 1973).
62. Outright dismissal at a late stage is especially onerous when it abrogates the
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The view that the dismissal of the representative plaintiff's in-
dividual cause of action necessitates the dismissal of the class action
is especially untenable with respect to class actions which have pro-
ceeded beyond certification under rule 23 (c) (1).(1 When a class ac-
tion has received certification, it obtains an independent legal ex-
istence before the court.64 Once this has occurred, there is no reason to
rights of those who had relied upon the adjudication of their personal claims in the
class action and who might otherwise have pursued an action on their own behalf, but
are now barred from doing so by the running of a statute of limitations. Cf. Philadel-
phia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967), modified,
47 F.R.D. 587 (E.D. Pa. 1969). Dismissal at a late stage also becomes critical in Title
VII actions where, following a dismissal of the named plaintiff, the judicial forum usu-
ally does not once again become available to the class until a new representative has,
like the dismissed plaintiff, gone through the lengthy process of exhausting all available
administrative remedies. See Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.
1968). See also Callier v. Hill, 326 F. Supp. 669, 673 (W.D. Mo. 1970). Moreover,
dismissal of the class aspect of any case at a late stage in the litigation may, in effect,
require the class to relitigate in a later proceeding issues which had already been fully
litigated. This would result in an inefficient duplication of effort and would place an
unnecessary burden upon already limited judicial resources, in addition to possibly plac-
ing severe strain on the financial resources of the class or its representatives. For these
reasons, a heavy burden should rest upon the defendant to prove the impropriety of
the class action when the named plaintiff is to be dismissed at a late stage in the pro-
ceedings.
Prior to the 23(c)(1) determination regarding maintainability, however, the bur-
den of establishing the right to invoke class action status is clearly placed upon the
plaintiffs. See Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159, 164 (5th Cir. 1971);
Cash v. Swifton Land Corp., 434 F.2d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 1970); Demarco v. Edens,
390 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968); McAdory v. Scientific Research Instruments, Inc.,
355 F. Supp. 468, 473 (D. Md. 1973). See generally 3B MooRE 23-02[21; 7
WRIGrr & MILLER § 1765, at 626. Therefore, there is less reason to be reluctant to
dismiss the class action due to the loss by the named plaintiff of his individual cause
of action subsequent to filing but before certification. See also notes 98-102 infra and
accompanying text.
63. See note 64 infra and text accompanying note 109 infra.
64. Since a class action is only presumed to exist for limited purposes on the basis
of the pleadings prior to certification, see note 100 infra, the class action cannot be
thought to exist before the court in a technical sense until that time. If certification
is denied under rule 23(c) (1), no significance can be subsequently attached to the fact
that the action was once denominated as a class action. Where certification is denied,
the action is "stripped of its character as a class action." Advisory Committee's Note
to Rule 23, supra note 2, at 104. But cf. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am.
Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 461 (E.D. Pa. 1968), modified, 47 F.R.D. 587 (E.D. Pa.
1969).
That the class aspect of the litigation is separate from the personal action of the
individual plaintiff is indicated by the fact that, at certification, the court makes a sep-
arate judicial determination that, in addition to the class representative, an aggrieved
class exists before it which complies with the requirements of rule 23; without such
a finding, the action cannot proceed as a class action. Weisman v. MCA, Inc., 45
F.R.D. 258, 261 (D. Del. 1968); 7 Wowrrr & MILLER § 1760, at 579. Furthermore,
at certification the class itself becomes entitled to a number of protective safeguards
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require the legal rights of the class to hinge on the success of the indi-
vidual claim of the class representative. Concrete adversity may persist
despite the loss to the representative of his own cause of action be-
cause the aggrieved class remains before 'the court due to the recogni-
tion of the class cause of action. An additional reason for not dismiss-
ing the class action in these circumstances results from the fact that
the basic idea of a class action involves an extension of the concept
of joinder of parties, since the class action form of proceeding is used
in lieu of the joinder of the class members.6 5 Much as it would be
improper to dismiss all the parties who had been joined in an action
under rules 19 or 20 simply because there was need to dismiss one
of them, 6 so it would seem improper to dismiss the claims of an en-
tire class simply because of the need to dismiss one of its members.
In addition, the court has the power following certification to sub-
divide the class and reclassify the issues as necessary to insure the ade-
quate representation and proper protection of the interests of the
which were not previously available to it. See note 105 infra. Indeed, it would not
be misleading to say that the class has been joined as a separate party to the action,
since the class action device is an outgrowth of the practice of permissive joinder, see
note 65 infra, and since dismissal of the class aspect of the litigation leaves the repre-
sentative's right to continue with his personal action unimpaired. See Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Rhodes, 403 F.2d 2, 5-6 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 965
(1969); Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
65. See ED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) which permits the maintenance of class actions
when, inter alia, "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable
.... " Historically, "[tihe class action was both an escape from and an adjustment
to the rule of joinder," since compulsory joinder would otherwise bar actions entirely
where joinder of all parties would be impossible. 3B MooRE 23:02[11, at 23-72.
The kinship between class ctions under 23(b) (2) and (b) (3) and joinder proce-
dure is further reflected in the similarity of the criteria for joinder of parties and for
maintenance of an action as a class action. Rule 20(a)'s prerequisite for permissive
joinder of parties that "any question of law or fact common to all [the joined parties)
... arise in the action," closely parallels rule 23(a)(2)'s requirement that there be
"questions of law or fact common to the class" in a class action under rule 23.
Actions under 23(b)(1) parallel the procedure of mandatory joinder under rule
19. See 7A WmRGHT & MILLER § 1772, at 4. The resemblance is logical and not acci-
dental. See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HA-v. L. REV. 356, 389 (1967).
66. See Fan. R. Civ. P. 20(a), which provides in part:
A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending
against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of
the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief ....
Thus, in cases where parties are joined for the sake of convenience and efficiency to
both the court and the parties, it is not contemplated that the substantive rights of the
joined parties should rise or fall together. See generally 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1652.
"[Elach plaintiff's right of action remains distinct, as if it had been brought sepa-
rately." Id. at 266-67.
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class" Therefore, if the court were to find that the dismissed repre-
sentative would inadequately represent the class, it is within the power
of the court to order the substitution of another representative or the
subdivision and realignment of the class or its issues under the best
available representation. In all class actions certified under 23 (c) (1),
this procedure would seem preferable to a dismissal of the entire class
action upon a finding that the named plaintiff could no longer be an
adequate class representative simply because of the failure or mootness
of his personal cause of action. 8
Second Approach: Stake in the Outcome as Unnecessary for Maintaining
Class Action Status
The second line of cases has adopted the view that, subsequent to
filing a class action, the loss to the named plaintiff of his personal
cause of action should generally have no effect upon either the contin-
ued maintainability of the class action or the ability of the named plain-
tiff to continue to represent the class. 9 It reasons that if the action
67. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(4) provides: "When appropriate (A) an action may
be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B)
a class may be divided into subclasses . . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) further pro-
vides: "In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appro-
priate orders . . . for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the
fair conduct of the action. .. ." See White v. Sullivan, 474 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1973);
7 WRIGr & MILLER § 1765, at 623-25.
68. Since the court has the responsibility and the power to issue orders for the pro-
tection of the interests of the class members under rule 23(d), see note 67 supra, the
court should not dismiss an otherwise maintainable class action until a reasonable time
has been allowed for the replacement of the representative parties. See Cox v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1972); 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1759, at 576-77;
cf. Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966). Further support for this
contention may be found in the language of rule 17 which provides that "[nlo action
shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of
commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest
." FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a). Thus, it might be argued that if a plaintiff has inad-
vertently lost his membership in the class and injustice would result from a flat dis-
missal of the action, then in one sense the plaintiff is simply not a real party in interest
and under the requirements of rule 17 an opportunity for joinder or substitution of a
real party should be provided. See 6 WRIGrr & MILLER § 1555, at 704-07.
69. The ratio decidendi of all the following cases is the same: The mere fact that
a named plaintiff has lost his personal cause of action after filing a justiciable claim
in conjunction with a class action is no reason to bar that plaintiff from continuing
to pursue the class cause of action; therefore, notwithstanding such a loss by the named
plaintiff, the class action must be allowed to continue normally. See, e.g., Roberts v.
Union Co., 487 F.2d 387 (6th Cir. 1973); Francis v. Allied Serv. Co., 486 F.2d 597
(5th Cir. 1973); Smith v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 486 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1973); Martin
v. Thompson Tractor Co., 486 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1973); Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485
F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973); Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973); Cox v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1972); Rivera v. Freeman, 469 F.2d
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has been properly pleaded,70 the representative can proceed to repre-
sent the class to the same extent he otherwise could have if no individ-
ual dismissal had occurred. The opinion in Moss v. Lane Co.71 illus-
trates this approach:
If the plaintiff were a member of the class at the commencement of the
action and his competency as a representative of the class [were] then
determined or assumed, the subsequent dismissal or mootness of his
individual claim, particularly in a discrimination case, will not operate
as a dismissal or render moot the action of the class, or destroy the
plaintiff's right to litigate the issues on behalf of the class.72
A similar result was reached by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Huff v. N.D. Cass Co.73  In an en banc reversal of its earlier decision
in the case,74 the Fifth Circuit held in Huff that a class action plaintiff
who had alleged unfair employment practices by his employer could
not be excluded from representing the class simply because the court
below had found, prior to certification, that the named plaintiff's indi-
vidual claim was without merit.75 The court of appeals did require on
remand that the trial court continue to consider the validity of -the
1159 (9th Cir. 1972); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28
(5th Cir. 1968); Wymelenberg v. Syman, 54 F.R.D. 198 (E.D. Wis. 1972); McGuire
v. Roebuck, 347 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Tex. 1972); Fogg v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
346 F. Supp. 645 (D.N.H. 1972); Gatling v. Butler, 52 F.R.D. 389 (D. Conn. 1971);
Vaughan v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37 (D. Axiz.) (three judge court), aff'd, 400 U.S.
884 (1970); Rackley v. Board of Trustees, 238 F. Supp. 512 (D.S.C. 1965); McSwain
v. Board of Educ., 138 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Tenn. 1956); cf. Hines v. City Fin. Co.,
474 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Palmer v. National Cash Register Co., 346 F. Supp.
1043 (S.D. Ohio 1972). See also Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian
Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967).
70. The previous analysis required no such presupposition, since under it the entire
action is to be terminated upon dismissal of the named plaintiff's personal claim regard-
less of whether the action was properly pleaded or not.
71. 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973).
72. Id. at 855 (emphasis added).
73. 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973).
74. Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 468 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1972), criticized in 5 RuTGERs-
CAMDEN L.J. 414 (1973). The reversal, however, did not come before the earlier cir-
cuit decision had been followed by the Sixth Circuit in Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d
190, 194 (6th Cir. 1972). Recently, the Sixth Circuit has reversed its holding in
Heard and now is in accord with the second Huff decision. Roberts v. Union Co.,
487 F.2d 397 (6th Cir. 1973).
75. "As to the right of Huff to maintain the class action, this court is committed
to the principle that the standard for determining whether a plaintiff may maintain a
class action is not whether he will ultimately prevail on his claim." 485 F.2d at 712.
Accord, Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972). Contra, White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412 (D.
Colo. 1971); Newman v. Avco Corp., 313 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Tenn.), rev'd on other
grounds, 453 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1970).
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class action as it had been initially pleaded. As a part of its ensuing
23(c)(1) certification hearing on the maintainability of the class ac-
tion, the trial court was directed especially to consider the plaintiff's
continuing "nexus" with the class in order to allow him to continue rep-
resenting it following certification. 6 Therefore, it may be inferred from
the court's opinion that the class action may continue and that the
named plaintiff may serve as class representative in the action, although
the court would only allow him to do so as long as that "nexus" en-
dures. On the other hand, the absence of this "nexus" would, under
this view, justify the dismissal of the individual plaintiff and in all prob-
ability the class action as well. 7
To the extent that these cases may be interpreted as generally
creating a right in the plaintiff to continue representing the class de-
spite his loss of a personal cause of action, 78 this view is too simplistic.
Such an interpretation of class action procedure overlooks the condi-
tional nature of the plaintiff's right to bring and maintain a class ac-
tion. Indeed, the portion of rule 23(a) which enables individuals
to sue on behalf of a class is written in permissive rather than manda-
tory language;79 the language of the rule itself does not appear to re-
quire that an action continue to be treated as a class action by the
courts in every case where the requirements of the rule were satisfied
at some previous time. Even after the court has certified that a class
action is maintainable, it may alter or amend that certification before
any decision on the merits has been reached; or it may require the in-
tervention of other plaintiffs in order to serve the interests of the class
or to assure the unequivocal presentation of issues in controversy.80
Accordingly, a representative plaintiff has no absolute right to repre-
sent the class. Therefore, it cannot be asserted categorically that the
cessation of a named plaintiff's individual cause of action has no effect
on the maintainability of the class action or on his representative status.
Moreover, it may also be the case that at certain early stages in the liti-
gation the termination of the plaintiff's personal cause of action
may properly terminate his right to pursue the class action further.41
76. 485 F.2d at 714.
77. Id.
78. This is the clear import of the court's language in Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d
853, 855 (4th Cir. 1973). See text accompanying note 72 supra.
79. Fm. R. Civ. P. 23(a) reads: "One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all . . ." (emphasis added). Likewise,
subsection 23(b) begins, "An action may be maintained as a class action if. . ." (em-
phasis added).
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1), (d)(4).
81. See notes 22-29, 52-55 supra, 98-102 infra and accompanying text.
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A corollary to the views presented in Moss and Huff concerning
the extent of the rights of named plaintiffs to represent class actions is
the assertion that the plaintiff class itself has a right to be represented
which should be unaffected by the disposition of the class representative's
claim prior to certification. It has been thought that once a class ac-
tion has been properly constituted at the time of filing, it acquires a
right to receive a judicial hearing which survives the dismissal of the
named representative's personal claim.8 2 This supposition resembles
the contention that since class actions are to be presumed valid prior
to certification,8 3 all class actions must proceed to a 23(c) (1) deter-
mination.84 Both of these positions would seem to be untenable.
One argument supporting the notion of a mandatory 23(c)(1)
hearing rests on the claim that the language of rule 23(c)(1) itself is
mandatory. Based upon the fact that the rule states "[a]s soon as
practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so main-
tained,"8" this argument reasons that the courts must make a 23(c)(1)
determination in every action brought as a class action.8 6 However,
the language of the rule is not wholly unconditional. It qualifiedly
states that the determination must be made only "[als soon
as practicable."8 " Arguably, it may be impracticable in some cases
for the court to undertake a 23(c)(1) determination following the loss
to the named representative of his individual cause of action, and in
those cases no such determination can be required. For example,
when the plaintiff, having lost his personal claim, no longer desires
to litigate his prior allegation of a class complaint, it may be imprac-
ticable for the court to instigate a 23(c) (1) hearing when no other
82. See La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 870, 489 P.2d
1113, 1116, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1971), which holds that a discharged class repre-
sentative continues to have a fiduciary duty to the class to vindicate its rights in a judi-
cial hearing. See also Bledsoe, supra note 29, at 461, who states:
lAin outright dismissal of the entire class action or a negative ruling on a
23 (c) (1) determination because of the representative's lack of standing is notjustifiable when the class has constitutional standing with respect to the chal-
lenged conduct.
83. The notion of presumptive validity results from the principle that prior to cer-
tification of the action as a maintainable class action under FED. 1. Cirv. P. 23(c) (1),
the suit should be treated as a class action for purposes of dismissal or compromise.
See Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v.
Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967), modified, 47 F.R.D. 587
(E.D. Pa. 1969). See also notes 89-97 infra and accompanying text.
84. See 3B MOORE 1 23.50; Bledsoe, supra note 29, at 446-48.
85. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(1) (emphasis added).
86. See 3B MooRE 23.50[1].
87. FD. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
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representative has presented himself to the court on behalf of the class
and when the membership of the class itself is as yet unknown. Thus,
it may be argued that the language of rule 23(c) (1) does mandate
a formal determination of class action status, but only in those cases
where such a determination is practicable. This argument is not ir-
refutable, since it can be argued in response that the "practicability"
requirement of rule 23(c)(1) refers only to the time when the deter-
mination is to be made, and not also to the feasibility of making such
a determination, but it does tend to refute the argument that the lan-
guage of the rule conclusively mandates a 23(c)(1) hearing in every
case.
8
Further undermining such a claim is the fact that there is little au-
thority to support the general notion that every alleged class is entitled
to a 23(c)(1) determination. The lone case which has been cited by
the commentators for this purpose, Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Ana-
conda American Brass Co.,"0 only substantiates this position in certain
situations. 0 In Philadelphia Electric the named plaintiffs filed a class
action suit alleging antitrust violations by the defendants. Prior to
certification, the plaintiffs and several of the defendants agreed upon a
private settlement which effectively would have bound the class, since
during the pendency of the action the statute of limitations had tolled."'
The court held that before the settlement could be approved under rule
23 (e), notice had to be given to the class members of the proposed
settlement of the action and of their right to intervene. Accordingly,
prior to certification the court assumed that the class action existed, but
only in a limited sense. The court stated that the action "must be as-
sumed to be class action for purposes of dismissal or compromise under
23(e) unless and until a contrary determination is made under 23 (c) -
().' '92 Thus it was the plaintiff's attempt to compromise the claims
of the class which led the court to decide to provide notice to the ab-
sent class members in spite of the fact that no 23 (c) (1) determination
88. Cf. Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 432 (9th Cir. 1969); Berman
v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 48 F.R.D. 333, 336 (D.R.I. 1969). See also 7A WRIGHT
& MILLER § 1785, at 130-31; Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning
Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39 (1967).
89. 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
90. See 3B MooRn 23.50, at 23-1103 nn.12, 13; Bledsoe, supra note 29, Cf.
Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323
F. Supp. 364, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1970), modified sub nom. Ace Heating & Plumbing Co.
v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971).
91. 42 F.R.D. 324, 325-26 (E.D. Pa. 1967). See generally Comment, Class Ac-
tions Under New Rule 23 and Federal Statutes of Limitation: A Study of Conflicting
Rationale, 13 VILL. L. Rnv. 370 (1968).
92. 42 F.R.D. at 326 (emphasis added).
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had yet formally established the existence of a maintainable class ac-
tion.93
Philadelphia Electric cannot be read to support the requirement of
a 23(c)(1) hearing in every caseY4 The court expressly limited its
language so as to presume the validity of the class action only for re-
stricted purposes.95 The only reason a 23(c)(1) determination oc-
curred in this case was that considerations of due process required no-
tice to be given to members of the class under rule 23(e) because
they would be bound by the consequences of the settlement.96 These
due process considerations are absent where the dismissal of the action
would not foreclose the class from seeking further relief.9 7  Therefore,
93. Id.
94. See Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Co., 323 F. Supp. 364, 373-74 (E.D. Pa. 1970), modified sub nom. Ace Heating &
Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971), where the court interpreted
Philadelphia Electric to pertain only to the due process requirement of notice to mem-
bers of a potential class.
95. See note 92 supra and accompanying text. In another opinion arising out of
the same case, the court further limited the language of Philadelphia Electric. Phila-
delphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968), modi-
fied, 47 F.R.D. 557 (E.D. Pa. 1969). According to this case there must be an affirma-
tive determination of maintainability by the court in order to relate the later validity
of the class action back to the time of filing of the action. Id. at 460. Thus, the
validity of a class action during the period between filing and certification is strictly
conditioned upon a retroactive 23(c)(1) determination of maintainability. The holding
of the earlier Philadelphia Electric case, requiring notice of a voluntary dismissal aris-
ing out of a settlement between the parties, therefore cannot be construed to create a
presumption of the substantive existence of a class action itself requiring that the action
proceed to certification in all cases. It is one thing to afford a potential class cause
of action the protection of certain present procedural safeguards, but it is quite another
to attempt to justify a claim of the actual existence of a cognizable class cause of action
between filing and certification simply on the basis of certain safeguards afforded the
asserted class because of the possible future finding that such an action exists. Thus,
a notion of presumptive validity cannot be used to validate the very existence of a class
cause of action prior to certification such as one must justify in order to entertain a
class action independent of any continuing private causes of action before the court.
96. The court stated: "Under these circumstances, it is imperative that no final
result be achieved as to any party without notice to those potentially affected thereby."
42 F.R.D. at 328. See also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Philadelphia Housing Authority
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364, 373-74 (E.D. Pa.
1970), modified sub nom. Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30
(3d Cir. 1971).
Moreover, the court indicated that its 23(c) (1) certification could be justified by
due process concepts, "even in the absence of Rule 23(e)." 42 F.R.D. at 327.
97. See Spriggs v. Wilson, 467 F.2d 382, 385-86 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Polakoff v. Del-
aware Steeplechase & Race Ass'n, 264 F. Supp. 915, 917 (D. Del. 1966).
It is generally understood that rule 23(e) applies only to voluntary dismissals by
the plaintiff, and not to dismissals by the court either for lack of jurisdiction or because
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a 23(c)(1) determination would not be an essential exercise in those
situations.
Both the assertion that the plaintiffs' rights to a 23 (c) (1) de-
termination are unconditional and the related view that an action in fa-
vor of the class may, merely on the basis of the pleadings, be pre-
sumed to exist prior to the certification of that action are deficient. As
was observed above,9 8 for the court to continue the proceeding on
behalf of an unrecognized class of plaintiffs beyond the named plain-
tiff's loss of his individual cause of action usually would violate the case
or controversy requirement of article IlI of the Constitution."9 During
the period between filing and certification, a class action is supported
solely by the pleadings, which may or may not have a foundation in
fact compatible with the requirements of rule 23(a) and (b). Since
the class has not yet been found to exist by the court, it is merely
thought or assumed to exist hypothetically for the limited purpose of
enabling the plaintiff to prove its actual existence.100 If, subsequent to
filing the action, the plaintiff's cause of action is lost, there is no longer
any actual party before the court with a claim against the defendant.
The representative no longer has a claim, and the class, since it has not
yet been actually recognized, cannot yet support an action before the
court. Indeed, the posture of the action at this point is not signifi-
cantly different from that in O'Shea v. Littleton,' where the presence
of a presently unaggrieved representative seeking to vindicate the rights
of an allegedly aggrieved, but unrecognized class, was held distinctly
to be violative of the case or controversy requirement. In either case it
of non-compliance with the requirements of rule 23, or after a decision on the merits.
See 3B MooR -  f 23.80[3], at 23-1507; 7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1797, at 235-36.
98. See text accompanying notes 22-25, 52-55 supra.
99. U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2. See Heumann v. Board of Educ., 320 F. Supp. 623,
624 (S.D.N.Y. 1970): "In the absence of any showing of continuing or potential harm
to this plaintiff ... further prolongation of the action would violate the "case or con-
troversy" requirement of Article III ... ." But see McGuire v. Roebuck, 347 F. Supp.
1111, 1114 (E.D. Tex. 1972):
The doctrine of mootness is tied to the concern that once a plaintiff loses
his right to relief the court, in effect, will be rendering an advisory opinion
if it continues since no actual controversy is before it. But this reasoning
does not apply in the class action context, because the fact that some members
of the class no longer are subject to the alleged discrimination does not de-
stroy the existence of a controversy between defendant and the remaining
class members.
100. See Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853, 855 (4th Cir. 1973). Prior to certifica-
tion, the class is only a denominated or putative class rather than an independent entity
before the court. See Spriggs v. Wilson, 467 F.2d 382, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Lopez
v. White Plains Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
101. 42 U.S.L.W. 4139 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1974). See notes 24, 25 supra and accom-
panying text.
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would be an act of judicial overreaching and solicitation to assert or
retain jurisdiction over a class action which an unaggrieved party seeks
to champion. 102 Accordingly, if a class representative loses his per-
sonal cause of action prior to the entry of a court order of certification,
the court would appear to be barred by the holding in O'Shea from
further entertaining the class action.
In sum, neither the approach represented ,by the Spriggs, Wat-
kins, and Norman line of cases,"0 3 which too readily rejects the in-
dividually unsuccessful named plaintiff as a continuing representative
of the class, nor the opposite approach used by the Huff and Moss
line,'0 4 which allows the continuing representation by such a party
even in the absence of a certified class, is wholly satisfactory for deal-
ing with the problem created by the class representative's loss of his
individual cause of action after a related justiciable class action has also
been filed.
THE CASE FOR A BIFURCATED APPROACH
Both of the approaches encountered above operate on the prem-
ise that the question concerning the continuation of class action status
following the representative's dismissal can be answered in a single
proposition of one sort or another. The first line of cases found that
the dismissal of the named representative logically entails the dismis-
sal of the entire action. The second view held that the maintainability
of class actions must be determined without regard to the subsequent
dismissal of thenamed representative by looking to whether the action
was maintainable as a class action at the time of filing and, in some
cases, by considering further the representative's continuing "nexus"
with the class. The various difficulties encountered by both of these
approaches can be avoided by dividing the judicial inquiry into two
distinct and unrelated questions. First, at the time when the plaintiff
lost his personal interest in the class, had a legally recognized class
action come into existence? And second, if, one 'had, who should
henceforth represent it?
One indication that the continued maintainability of a class action
and its proper representation are logically separable issues is the fact
that as the litigation advances the class becomes entitled to specified
protective safeguards and acquires certain rights which are independent
of the posture of the class representative. 10 5 In order to know the im-
102. See notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 45-50 supra and accompanying text.
104. See notes 69-77 supra and accompanying text.
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2). Members of a class certified under 23(c)(1) have
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pact which a plaintiff's dismissal will have upon a given class action, it
may therefore be necessary to know the status of that action at the time
of the dismissal. If the class action has been certified by the court,
then the hurdle of nonjusticiability following dismissal of the represen-
tative's claim can be overcome by asserting the separate legal existence
of the class before the court wholly independent of the representative
plaintiff. 10 6 On the other hand, the question of who should continue
to represent that class must be answered through a consideration of
the representative's continuing ability fairly and concretely to present
and pursue the action of the absent class members. This is a question
which is separate from the question whether a valid class action contin-
ues to exist.'0 7  Thus, in practice, it should not be enough to show
that the individual plaintiff no longer has a cause of action in his per-
sonal capacity in order to justify dismissing the class action. Nor
should it suffice to assert the continuing maintainability of the class
action in order to justify allowing the original plaintiff to continue to
represent it. Further consideration of the criteria involved in determin-
ing the existence of a recognizable class action and the adequacy of
representation is necessary in order to develop an analytical framework
for dealing consistently with these problems.
When is a Class Action Recognizable As Such?
To answer the question whether the class action itself should be al-
lowed to proceed despite the loss by the class representative of his indi-
vidual cause of action, one must first answer the question: when has a
class become a class? This question must be asked with respect to
to three time periods: (1) when the plaintiff loses his individual right
to sue before the filing of the class action, (2) when the loss occurs
between the filing of the action and the order certifying the action as a
class action, and (3) after certification. Written opinions concerning
dismissals falling in the first and last time periods appear less fre-
quently than those which concern dismissals occurring in the second,
the latter being considerably harder to deal with.
the right to be protected generally as the court deems necessary. This right includes,
but is not limited to, notice advising class members of their right to present individual
damage claims, notice of proposed modifications in the action, and the opportunity to
express disapproval of the representation of the class, or to intervene in the action per-
sonally. See generally 7A WhIGHT & MILLER § 1793.
106. See note 64 supra.
107. These conclusions are supported by the fact that parties plaintiff may generally
intervene in, exchange representative roles in, or sever connections with a class action
and still leave that particular action in progress. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
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On the one extreme, if a plaintiff has lost the ability to allege
personal injury prior to filing the class action, it is clear that he
cannot bring a justiciable cause of action either on behalf of himself or
his class.108 Therefore, the problem of continuing class action status
following the discovery of such a loss should not arise at all. Likewise
on the other end of the procedural scale, when the plaintiff's dismis-
sal occurs following a 23(c)(1) decree, -this development should not
affect the continued existence of the class action. Here the class ac-
tion has been judicially determined to be maintainable, and an ag-
grieved class apart from the representative has been found to exist. 09
Thus, the only problem confronting the court in this situation is se-
curing adequate representation for the action. Concerning the interim
time period between the filing and the certification of the action, it
has already been argued that to continue to entertain a class action
once the representative plaintiff has lost his individual cause of ac-
tion would violate the case or controversy requirement of article I.110
The action is not justiciable and the court may not assert jurisdiction
over it. It follows then that the issuance of a 23(c)(1) certification
provides a primary line of demarcation between those actions which
can continue to exist after the dismissal of the individual representa-
tive and those which cannot.
In certain exceptional circumstances, however, it can persuasively
be contended that class actions which have not yet been found main-
tainable under 23(c)(1) at the time of the dismissal of the represen-
tative's cause of action should nevertheless be found to be recogniz-
able and thereby be permitted to continue.
The first exception recognizes that there may be situations in
which, if the class action were to be dismissed prior to certification due
to the mootness of the class representative's claim, it would be unlikely
that the claim of the class ever could be adjudicated."1 This would
108. O'Shea v. Littleton, 42 U.S.L.W. 4139 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1974). See notes 24, 25
supra and accompanying text.
109. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
110. See notes 22-25, 52-55, 98-102 supra and accompanying text.
111. Such possibilities are inherent in cases presenting the type of factual situation
which existed in Rivera v. Freeman, 469 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1972). In Rivera, the
class representative sought to challenge on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated the constitutionality of a statute which allowed the detention of juveniles for
up to 72 hours without a judicial hearing. It is clear that the state could successfully
avoid any challenge to this statute by promptly releasing any detainee who sought to
assert in a class action the unconstitutionality of this statute. Once the detainee had
been released, the relief which he had personally sought would have been obtained, and
his cause of action would become moot. If the mootness of each representative's
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be the case if the defendant were to attempt to avoid class litigation
by mooting the claim of any class representative who files a class ac-
tion against him without mooting the claim with respect to the rest of
the class. 11 If the courts were willing to dismiss class actions as a result
of such tactics, the defendant could successfully preclude the class from
ever receiving an adjudication of its case on the merits by defeating ser-
iatim each representative's cause of action.11 In order to avoid this
sort of evasion of justice, the courts should depart from a strict adher-
ence to the case and controversy requirement and permit the class
action -to continue whenever it appears that the class action as pleaded
would continue to assert a redressable claim under adequate represen-
tation.
In the second type of exceptional case, when the plaintiff's in-
dividual claim is defeated during a period of undue and avoidable ju-
dicial delay in certifying the class action, the harm to the aggrieved
class caused by the resultant dismissal of the class action 1 4 may be reme-
died by determining the maintainability of the class action based on
the facts as they existed at the time the determination should have
been made."" While it has never been specified how extensive the pre-
certification hearings ought to be, rule 23 (c) (1) requires that certifi-
cation issue "as soon as practicable after the commencement of [the]
action."' 6  Therefore, if the court has caused extensive preliminary
cause of action could be held to be grounds for dismissal of the class action, every
class action brought by such plaintiffs could be automatically dismissed.
112. See note 29 supra.
113. See, e.g., La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 873, 489
P.2d 1113, 1118, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 854 (1971) where the court states:
If other borrowers bring a class action, [defendant] may again waive as to
those representative borrowers, and again move to dismiss the action. Such
a procedure could be followed ad infinitum for each successive group of rep-
resentative plaintiffs. If defendant is permitted to succeed with such revolving
door tactics, only members of the class who can afford to initiate or join liti-
gation will obtain redress; relief for even a portion of the class would compel
innumerable appearances by individual plaintiffs. Yet the function of the
class action is to avoid the imposition of such burdens upon the class and
upon the court.
114. See note 62 supra.
115. Somewhat similar treatment of a class action has been advocated where certifi-
cation has been unavoidably delayed. It has been argued that in this situation the ac-
tion should be treated as if it had already been certified, at least for purposes of dis-
missal or compromise, until the court can make its decision concerning the maintain-
ability of the class action. 7A WRIGHT & M=R § 1785, at 130-31. The most likely
reason for this recommended treatment is to protect the putative class by requiring no-
tice to potential class members of attempts to dismiss or compromise the class action
in a way which would jeopardize the rights of the class members to seek further relief
against the defendant in the future. See notes 96, 97 supra and accompanying text.
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1). See notes 85-88 supra and accompanying text.
This has been interpreted to mean "the earliest pragmatically wise moment." Berman
v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 48 F.R.D. 333, 336 (D.R.L 1969).
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hearings to be conducted to probe into the merits of the individual
plaintiff's cause of action before reaching a 23(c)(1) determination, 117
or if there is undue delay for other reasons, the grounds may be laid
for legally recognizing the class action retroactively to the time when
maintainability should have been determined."'
A possible third exception could arise when the action as filed
constitutes a "perforce"'' 9 class action. Certain ,types of actions may
be class actions by their very nature due to the fact that the character
of the defendant's conduct necessarily affects a certain class as a
class.' 2 ° It may therefore be possible to recognize those actions as
constituting class actions at law from the point of their inception, for
whenever an action is a class action of necessity, it will always be
"practicable" to certify the action as soon as it is -filed.'2'
117. Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973); Moss v. Lane, 471 F.2d
853 (4th Cir. 1973); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972).
118. This exception would have provided alternative grounds for the results reached
in Huff and Moss, see notes 71-77 supra and accompanying text, since in such cases
the lower court had refused to certify the class action until after the plaintiff's individ-
ual cause of action had been thoroughly examined to see whether it was likely to suc-
ceed.
119. See Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th Cir. 1968); Callier v.
Hill, 326 F. Supp. 669, 673 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
120. For example, discrimination based upon racial or ethnic classifications as well
as most other forms of discrimination by definition imply discrimination against a
group of persons as a group; see Hall v. Werthan Bag Co., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186
(M.D. Tenn. 1966). Similarly, abuse of political power logically entails the abuse of
the rights of some political body. Not all actions, however, brought as class actions
would be perforce class actions. For example, the construction of a highway does not
necessarily entail offending the rights of citizens, even though on some occasions high-
way construction may deprive an identifiable class of people of certain rights to an un-
defiled environment. See Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971).
Under this conceptualization, a perforce class action was explicitly recognized as
such in Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968), but not in Callier
v. Hill, 326 F. Supp. 669 (W.D. Mo. 1970). See also Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969); Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp.
184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
The suggestion has also been made that certain aspects of the substantive law have
come to embrace class concepts and that the substantive law now recognizes class
causes of action where offenses against the public have occurred through various abuses
of collective powers. Examples of such offenses have been cited in both the antitrust
and consumer protection areas. See Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device
upon the Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 307 (1973). Such class actions could also be
designated as perforce class actions.
121. This exception would permit the result in several cases, predominantly Title
VII actions, which have allowed a class action to continue, despite the dismissal of the
named plaintiffs personal action, by proceeding on the grounds that the class per se
has a legal cause of action. See, e.g., Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973); Fogg v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 346 F.
Supp. 645 (D.N.H. 1972).
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To summarize, a class is not a class until it has been recognized
in fact or is recognizable at law. Thus, an alleged class action should
not be allowed to continue following the dismissal of its named rep-
resentative unless the class action has either been certified under 23(c)-
(1) or one of these three types of exceptional circumstances is present.
The Ability of a Discharged Representative to Continue Representing
the Class Action
Independent of the question whether the class action can continue
is the question of who should represent it. Many legal concepts have
figured into analyses of this question, but none of them has proved to
be particularly satisfactory. One of the most baffling aspects of the
problem is the fact that the rule does not clearly define the standards
by which the named representative's capacity and right to represent
the class should be determined. 122
According to the analysis presented in this Comment, the ques-
tion of whether a named plaintiff may continue to represent a class
following the loss of his own cause of action can only arise under two
circumstances: when his dismissal follows the certification of a class
122. There has been some controversy concerning the time at which the representa-
tive must be deemed to have been adequate in order to allow him to serve as class
representative. Some courts indicate that if the plaintiff was an adequate representative
at the time of filing, then subsequent developments will not diminish his ability to rep-
resent the class. See Gatling v. Butler, 52 F.R.D. 389, 395 (D. Conn. 1971): "Gat-
ling must be deemed to have been a proper representative of the class from the
time suit was initiated." Accord, Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853, 855 (4th Cir.
1973); cf. Hines v. City Fin. Co., 474 F.2d 430, 433 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Others
have required that the plaintiff must be an adequate representative at the time of cer-
tification, and that dismissal prior to certification weighs conclusively against his repre-
sentativeness. See Watkins v. Chicago Housing Authority, 406 F.2d 1234, 1236-37
(7th Cir. 1969): "It must be a novel theory ... that named plaintiffs without the
right to further represent themselves can continue to represent unnamed parties alleg-
edly in a similar situation. .. . [Because of] the changed status of the named plain-
tiffs ...this contention is devoid of merit." Cf. Spriggs v. Wilson, 467 F.2d 382,
385 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Neither approach is a satisfactory one, however, in that events may occur subse-
quent to filing and subsequent to certification which may affect the ability of the rep-
resentative to represent the class interests adequately. See Sol S. Turnoff Drug
Distribs., Inc. v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 51 F.R.D.
227 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Thus, although membership in the class at the time of filing
would seem to be a minimal requirement of adequate representation, see Fitzgerald v.
Kriss, 10 F.R.D. 51, 55 (N.D.N.Y. 1950); 7 Wanxmr & MILLER § 1761, no single point
should be designated as the sole time when the representative's capacity to represent
the class should be determined. Instead, the courts should constantly reevaluate the
named plaintiff's representative status in light of all events which occur during the
cause of action.
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action 23 or when it precedes certification but the action is allowed to
continue, because under one of the three exceptions dismissal of the
named plaintiff's cause of action prior to certification does not also
entail dismissal of the class aspect of the action.12 4  Under these cir-
cumstances, adequacy of representation remains as a distinct issue for
the court to consider independent of the question of whether the class
action should be allowed to continue.125 In so doing, the court may
either adjudge the adequacy of -the plaintiff's representativeness from
a direct examination of all the facts and circumstances of the partic-
ular case, 126 or it may attempt to utilize certain other legal concepts
as touchstones of adequate representation. Three such concepts have
been used most commonly as indicia of adequate representation,
namely, class membership, standing, and typicality. However, none of
these criteria can be supported by the plain language of the rule as
being necessary for a named plaintiff to be an adequate representative.
Further, it is submitted that such concepts are simply inappropriate for
resolving the question of adequacy of representation as it arises in
these contexts.
Membership in the Class. Rule 23 states that "[o]ne or more
members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on be-
half of all . . ,,'2. Therefore, it has been stated that membership in
the class is a required characteristic of the class representative. 2 s The
caveat has thus been implied that dismissal of the individual plaintiff's
claim operates to terminate membership in the class and, by the same
token, the capacity to sue on its behalf. Based upon this reasoning,
the Supreme Court in Hall v. Beals 29 held that plaintiffs who had not
personally suffered under the state residency laws whose constitution-
ality -they sought to challenge in a class action could not represent the
class of voters who had. Recent authority, however, has rejected the
dictum that current or continuing membership in the class is a re-
quired trait of the class representative under rule 23, so long as the
named plaintiff held a definable membership in the class he seeks
123. See text accompanying notes 98-102 supra.
124. See text accompanying notes 111-21 supra.
125. See notes 63-68 supra and accompanying text.
126. See notes 145-53 infra and accompanying text.
127. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). See generally 7 WuoHT & MELLER § 1761.
128. See, e.g., Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962); Chatman v. Barnes, 357 F.
Supp. 9 (N.D. Okla. 1973). See generally McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
129. 396 U.S. 45 (1969). See also O'Shea v. Littleton, 42 U.S.L.W. 4139 (U.S.
Jan. 15, 1974).
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to represent at the time the action was filed.80 Hall v. Beals, it is ar-
gued, does not contradict this position since the plaintiff in that case
was never a member of the class.' 3 ' Therefore, it cannot be cited
for the proposition that a plaintiff cannot represent a class if he was
once a part of that class.
Rule 23(a) lists four prerequisites to a class action. 8 2  It does
not indicate that "membership" in the class per se should be treated as
a fifth prerequisite to the class action. Indeed, it does not even de-
fine what is meant by class "membership." The apparent reason for
this is that, prior to a final decision on the merits of the case, member-
ship in the class is strictly a factual matter which can only be deter-
mined with reference to the definition of the class as drafted and pro-
posed by the plaintiff himself. Actual legal membership in the class
cannot specifically be determined until judgment is entered in the ac-
tion brought as a class action, since it is at that time that the court
determines who is entitled to share in the relief obtained by the repre-
sentative.1 3  Therefore, lack of membership in the class cannot ba
used as a meaningful index for ascertaining the ability of a dismissed
representative to serve as a named party to a continuing class action.
Typicality. Although it is clear that an individual plaintiff may
be no longer "similarly situated" with the class after the termination
of his personal cause of action, this does not also necessarily imply that
such a plaintiff has failed to raise claims typical of those of the class
under rule 23(a)(3) and that he may therefore no longer represent the
action on behalf of the class.' In deciding whether the personal
claims which the plaintiff has raised are "typical claims," one should
130. See Vaughan v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D. Ariz.), afrd, 400 U.S. 884
(1970).
131. The Court in Hall had stated, 'The [plaintiffs] 'cannot represent a class of
[which] they are not a part' . . . a class of which [they] have never been members."
396 U.S. at 49 (citation omitted).
132. See note 5 supra.
133. See generally 3B MooRE 23.01[1l.-3], at 23-33.
134. The claim of atypicality has been raised against an unsuccessful named plain-
tiff to defeat his continuing representation when he no longer could be considered simi-
larly situated with the class because he had received full satisfaction of his personal
claims, without corresponding satisfaction of the class grievances. See Geehring v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 357 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Callier v. Hill, 326 F. Supp. 669
(W.D. Mo. 1970). Being "similarly situated," however, is not a specific requirement
of rule 23, see note 14 supra and accompanying text. And even if it were to be consid-
ered an implied prerequisite of class action status, the fact that one is no longer simi-
larly situated with the class does not entail the conclusion that he was never so situ-
ated. Thus, the question is left whether he has been thereby sufficiently "similarly sit-
uated" in order to qualify as an adequate representative of the continuing class action,
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not look predominately to the validity of those allegations or to the
likelihood that the representative will be successful in proving them,
but primarily to their substance.135 If the allegations of the represen-
tative are fundamentally those which the members of the class -them-
selves would raise, then the prerequisite of rule 23(a)(3) would ap-
pear to be fully satisfied regardless of whether the representative's per-
sonal claim is subsequently lost. Therefore, the provision requiring
the existence of typical claims in the action also would not tend to sub-
vert the ability of a representative who has lost his personal cause of ac-
tion to adequately protect or promote those claims on behalf of the
class.' 3 6
Standing. Some cases have relied heavily upon a finding of a
plaintiff's lack of continued standing with respect to his personal claim
as a justification for finding that he has become an inadequate repre-
sentative of the class and that he is therefore no longer capable of
maintaining the class action.' 37 Thus, the Third Circuit has ruled
that a "plaintiff who is unable to secure standing for himself is cer-
tainly not in a position to 'fairly insure the adequate representation'
of those alleged to be similarly situated."' 3  As a general principle of
law, however, the assertion that adequate class representation cannot
be provided by a plaintiff who is unable to retain his personal standing
in the action lacks merit.
Wherever representative actions are involved, it may be argued
that the concepts of standing and personal stake are not coextensive
and that the absence of a personal stake in the action on the part of
the representative may not entail a loss of standing simpliciter3 9 Ac-
135. See Mersay v. First Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), a class
action which was held to comply with the typicality requirement even though the in-
dividual plaintiff was barred from recovery by defenses peculiar to him which would
not bar other members.
136. It has been contended that the typicality requirement has no unique content
or independent importance at all. See 3B MOORE I 23.06-2: "In fact, there is no need
for this clause, since all meanings attributable to it duplicate requirements prescribed
by other provisions in Rule 23." Id. at 23-325.
137. See Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962).
138. Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 734 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971). See also Rothblum v. Board of Trustees, 474 F.2d 891,
899 (3d Cir. 1973); 7 WuGrrr & MILLER § 1761, at 590.
139. Whenever associations, parents, trustees, corporate officers, etc., are allowed to
assert the rights of others, they have standing to sue although they clearly have no per-
sonal stake in the action. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952)
(parents asserting the rights of school children); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (organization asserting the rights of its members);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parochial school asserting the rights
of its students); Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956)
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cordingly, it has been held that the representative of a class action need
not retain a personal stake in the outcome of the action in order to
satisfy the standing requirement, so long as he can provide competent
representation of the controverted issues raised by the class action. 140
This accords with the fact that rule 23(a)(4) makes no mention of
standing or personal stake, but speaks only of an ability to provide
"fair and adequate" representation as an essential attribute of a class
representative. 141
Since the concept of standing itself is broad enough to encom-
pass the recognition of a party's right of access to the federal courts as
a representative of other persons' interests, 142 a class representative
may be said to have standing by virtue of his fulfillment of the role of a
representative party. Therefore, to argue that a plaintiff may not
represent a class action simply because he lacks standing is to engage in
a tautology, since one cannot conclude that a party lacks standing to
continue to represent the class until one first ascertains whether that
party would be an adequate representative. Whether that party occu-
pies the role of a recognizable representative is the precise question that
was to be answered by reference to the requirement of standing to rep-
resent the class. Thus, the concept of standing cannot be appealed to
as a bar against the plaintiff's right or ability to represent a class ac-
tion where the status of being an adequate representative is one of the
elements of the very concept of standing.
Standing primarily requires an assurance of adversity between the
parties present to an action in order to avoid the issuance of advisory
(school board raising the rights of school children). Concerning competency to sue
in a representative capacity on behalf of corporations and others, see C. WwuHT, LAW
OF FEnDMAL CoUrTs § 70, at 295-96 (2d ed. 1970); Sedler, Standing to Assert Consti-
tutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YAr.E L.L 599, 626-48 (1962).
140. See McGuire v. Roebuck, 347 F.Supp. 1111, 1125 (E.D. Tex. 1972); La Sala v.
American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
See also Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?,
78 YALE LJ. 816 (1969).
141. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
142. See note 139 supra. Cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), where the
Court provided an alternative analysis by holding that the principle of standing is
linked to a court-developed rule of self-restraint which should not be applied where it
would be difficult for the persons whose rights are asserted to present their grievance
before any court. In Barrows a white defendant was allowed to assert the rights of
all blacks against an unconstitutional racially restrictive covenant, thus presenting a sit-
uation not unlike a conventional 23 (b) (2) class action challenging the unconstitution-
ality of state action or seeking an injunction on behalf of a specific class. Thus, repre-
sentatives may either be thought to satisfy the standing requirement themselves or else
the doctrine of standing is arguably inapposite under the foregoing argument that re-
straint should not be applied so long as representation of an adverse claim is adequate.
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opinions in violation of the case or controversy requirement of article
TIJ.'1 Wherever the class action has been certified as an action by the
court, the case or controversy provision of the Constitution will be sat-
isfied by the presence of the class controversy which, in those circum-
stances, remains following the dismissal of the named representative's
claim.144  Thus, in such cases the adversity of an actual controversy
clearly persists between the claims of the class and the denials of the
defendant, which satisfies the adversity requirement necessary to allow
the exercise of federal judicial power. Whether a particular dismissed
plaintiff can thereafter adequately preserve this adverseness should be
determined by examining the facts of the case to determine whether
he will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class, and
not by trying to determine whether he retains personal standing.
Adequacy of Representation. Thus, whether a plaintiff can ade-
quately represent the interests of the class is a question which must be
decided purely upon the facts of each individual case. 45 For this
reason, the Fifth Circuit has recently advanced the theory that a dis-
missed plaintiff need only manifest "the nexus required by Rule 23" in
order to permit him to continue to serve as a representative of the ac-
tion. '4 Though the contours of this vague concept have not yet
been clearly defined, they may be expected ,to resemble the criteria
generally used in judging the adequacy of representation, including the
following: the ability of the plaintiff's counsel to conduct the litiga-
tion,147 the possible presence of amici curiae in the case, 4 ' the likeli-
hood of collusion between the class representative and the defendant,14 9
the checks against antagonistic interests or disproportionate personal
143. The doctrine of standing and the requirement of a case or controversy derive
from article m, section 2 of the Constitution. Association of Data Processing Serv.
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
101 (1968). See generally C. WRiGHT, supra note 139, § 13; Bickel, Foreword: The
Passive Virtues, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 40, 42 (1961).
144. See text accompanying notes 64, 109 supra.
145. See 7 WRiGHr & MELLER § 1765, at 622.
146. Francis v. Allied Serv. Co., 486 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1973); Huff v. N.D. Cass
Co., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973). See notes 73-77 supra and accompanying text.
147. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968). This con-
sideration will vary in direct relationship to the complexity of the legal issues that need
to be argued by counsel on behalf of the class. See Wymelenberg v. Syman, 54 F.R.D.
198 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 52 F.R.D. 510 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
148. See Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (N.D.N.Y. 1969), a!f'd sub nom. Wy-
man v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970). The amicus curiae briefs here tended to insure
that the class interests would be thoroughly and competently advocated and protected.
149. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391
F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968); 7 WRiGHT & MmLER § 1768.
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interests on the part of the individual representative,' ° and the repre-
sentative's ability to protect the rights of the class under the require-
ments of due process.:51  In addition, a "nexus" may arise from the
fact that the plaintiff had a recent and relatively thorough personal as-
sociation with the situation out of which the cause of action has
arisen, 152 and that he was individually affected by the actions of the de-
fendant alleged in -the class action, at least to some significant extent.
It is also possible that the continuing ties which the plaintiff and his
attorney share with the class' community may be treated as material
factors in some cases. In any event, it is not required that the "best"
representative be produced in order to insure "adequate" representa-
tion of the class action,'5 8 and this promises to be especially true when
social or economic factors would make it difficult for other represen-
tatives to step forward to assume the leadership of the class. There-
fore, the decision whether the named plaintiff should be allowed to
continue to serve as the representative of the class in a viable class action
despite his individual dismissal from the action should rest upon the
trial court's conclusion as to whether factors such as those discussed
above are present in sufficient number and degree to establish this
continuing "nexus" between the named plaintiff and the class.
CONCLUSION
As long as a class action procedure is available under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts will be confronted with prob-
lems stemming from the inevitable disparity of individual characteris-
tics existing among the members of the class. This type of problem is
150. See generally 3B MooR 23.07[2]; 7 WRiarr & MuLnn § 1768. Although
antagonistic or disproportionate interests on the part of the representative with respect
to other members of the class may affect his ability to represent the class, courts have
not gone so far as to require that his claim be identical with those of the rest of the
class. See notes 14-20 supra and accompanying text.
151. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Due process demands a fair and
adequate hearing concerning the claims of the class. Criteria which the courts may
take into consideration in determining whether due process will be assured under the
representation of the named plaintiff include the following: (1) the ease with which
the case may be decided in terms of legal argument, Wymelenberg v. Syman, 54 F.R.D.
198 (E.D. Wis. 1972); (2) how difficult it would be for other members of the class
to initiate another action de novo, Craddock v. Hill, 324 F. Supp. 183, 189 (W.D. Mo.
1970); (3) how urgent the need for relief appears to be, and whether any self-initiated
conciliatory measures by the defendant have changed the underlying motivation sustain-
ing the class action, Caplin v. Oak, 356 F. Supp. 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also 7
WPsGsr & MiLLER § 1765, at 618.
152. See Burney v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 302 F. Supp. 86 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
See generally 47 TuLANE L. REv. 1005, 1006-11 (1973).
153. See 7 WIGHT & MImLER § 1765, at 620.
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accentuated when differences arise between the legal rights vis-h-vis
the defendant of the representative of the class action and those of the
class itself. Whether the class action is maintainable under these cir-
cumstances and whether the named plaintiff may continue to repre-
sent the class in the action are questions which have not yet been an-
swered by the Supreme Court.15 4  As the problem has arisen in several
contexts, the federal courts have come to handle the issue in two mu-
tually exclusive ways, following the prima facie attractiveness of two
separate propositions: first, that a class action cannot be brought by
a person who is not a member of .the class, and contrariwise, that a
class action over which the federal courts have jurisdiction may not
be deprived its day in court merely because the named representative
is no longer capable of personally participating in the class judgment.
It has been argued that these basic statements are not fundamentally
irreconcilable, once their precise meanings have been developed and
correlated with two distinct questions concerning, first, the existence of,
and second, the representation of class actions. These two questions
have been shown to be logically independent of one another, since
the fact that adequate representation can be assured does not necessar-
ily imply the underlying existence of a viable class action, nor can a dis-
missal of the named representative terminate the rights of a class to a
class adjudication once it has been (or has some exceptional right to
be) properly constituted under a rule 23(c)(1) court certification.
Therefore, only on the fulfillment of the separate conditions that the
class action has been recognized (or is recognizable) under 23(c)(1)
and that the class plaintiff continues to manifest a relationship with the
class capable of insuring its adequate representation should a class ac-
tion plaintiff be allowed to continue in his representative status follow-
ing the dismissal of his personal cause of action.
154. The dissent in O'Shea v. Litfleton, 42 U.S.L.W. 4139 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1974), is
clearly correct when it points out that the oft-quoted line to the effect that a plaintiff
cannot represent a class of whom he is not a member, Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S.
31, 32-33 (1962), see text accompanying note 43 supra, is dictum and that the issues
presented in this Comment have never been squarely confronted on any other occasion.
The upshot is that one crucial issue [concerning the existence of a case or
controversy in the absence of an actionable personal claim by the named plain-
tiffs], on which the Court makes this case turn has not been decided by the
Court and was never argued here. At the very least we should have a full-
dress reargument on that point. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4145.
It is suggested that "that point" embraces not one, but two crucial issues, namely, the
existence of a recognizable case or controversy before the court and the independent
ability of the plaintiff to represent it.
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